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Prologue: What are we Doing? 
 Reading The Human Condition means searching for the stories that Hannah Arendt 
threads through it. On the part of the reader, this search requires efforts in re-description and re-
telling—finding one’s own path to follow Arendt as she writes. These efforts are made possible 
by the intricate theoretical and historical picture of our shared condition—or vita activa—that 
Arendt illustrates through her book. Setting off from this picture, I will try to retell the story I’ve 
found during my brief time with the book. This story departs from a theoretical view of the book 
in search of its poetic elements. But to make this departure I will take a moment to describe, 
however partially, the wide arc of relationships gathered together in the book, beginning in the 
most abstract possibilities and broadening towards the actual appearances of these possibilities.  
 To begin, human beings have certain inherent capacities. We can use things, make things, 
and can communicate and exchange with each other. We also have capacities for thought, 
cognition, and logical reasoning. These capacities correspond to particular activities that fall into 
three distinct modes: labor, work and action. Each of these activities relate to a particular kind of 
space. Labor is all that we do to survive. We consume and expend energy to find food, to eat, 
sleep, fight, etc. Our labors take place on and bind us to the Earth. They are necessitated by the 
fact that as mortals fated to live and die, we ultimately follow the same cyclical laws as 
everything else that grows from nature. Work allows us to build a manmade world over the 
Earth, transforming its raw material into a home for humans beings to spend their lives. The 
world is built and populated with things that may endure the forces of nature. No thing can 
endure forever, but in concert they last long enough to give a sense of tangible continuity to the 
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generations that pass through the world. Among other things, workers make tools, design 
dwellings, form constitutions. Artists are workers too, but the objects they make stand out from 
others due to their inherent fragility, uselessness, and remarkable endurance. The significance 
and peculiarity of works of art in The Human Condition lies at the center of our story. Finally, the 
capacity for action, which always occurs as speech and action, that produce the momentary 
appearance of words and deeds in which someone discloses who they are—namely, the person 
who chose to act. All actions fall into the intangible and ever-rewoven web of human 
relationships that Arendt sometimes describes as overlaid, and sometimes as overgrowing, the 
world.  
 The combined actualization of these capacities conveys dynamic articulations of the 
relationship between private and public life. For Arendt, this relationship occurs in different 
forms at several distinct scales. For example, she discusses the physical barrier between private 
and communal spaces; the difference between private relationships between lovers and families, 
and public relationships between friends, societies, and political bodies. She also attributes 
privacy or publicity to particular activities. Arendt relates these tangible manifestations of the 
relationship to intangible privacy of the mind, of inner feelings and thoughts which she opposes 
to the publicity of appearance in the world. These articulations change over time. Both what we 
do and how we understand what we do alter how we understand our location between public and 
private life. This in turn changes how we labor, work, and act, and thus how we understand our 
place ourselves on Earth, in the World, in constant relationship to others.   
 Through her book, Arendt draws and redraws the different “constellations within the 
hierarchy of activities as we know them from western history” (6). How all of these elements 
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relate to one another at any given moment—sometimes illuminating and other times covering 
each other over—shows us a different facet of a condition we share with others not only present 
across lands and seas, but in time past and future. 
 Before we draw out our own stories from the book, we should recognize the two ‘stories’ 
Arendt announces at the end of the book’s prologue. The book will tell its first story through an 
analysis of the “general human capacities which grow out of the human condition and are 
permanent" (6). She will develop her picture of the human condition by looking at the changes 
between historical articulations of the relationship between the labor-work-action triad and 
public and private life. The second story tells us of the roots of “modern world alienation,” a 
situation of disorientation and worldlessness. spoken and unspoken, that manifests in the Modern 
World. She traces the roots of this situation through a story of the scientific and intellectual 
developments of the “Modern Age,” which began with Galileo’s telescope in the 17th and 
culminated in the early 20th century with the appearance of quantum physics. This age 
precipitated the present “Modern World,” which “was born with the first atomic explosions” (6).  
 Arendt declares two important systematic omissions from her stories. From the first story 
she excludes, broadly, discussion of the activity of thinking, “the highest and perhaps purest 
activity of which men are capable" (5). She reasons that traditionally and currently thinking has 
not been considered “within the range of every human being” (5). in the same way that labor, 
work, and action have been. From the second story, she excludes a picture of the Modern World 
even though it is the era within which she writes. Her reason is simply that we cannot do justice 
to a story before it has run its course. The second story confines itself to understanding “how 
society developed and presented itself at the very moment it was overcome by the advent of a 
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new and yet unknown age” (6). The Modern Age began and ended in a rupture, so that previous 
understanding’s of the human condition hardly seem to describe modern life. The goal of the 
book is not to define and fix our situation, but to develop ways of reflecting on that situation as it 
unfolds. Through the second story she wants to ask how we once responded to moments where 
our sense of reality shattered, and what we can learn from those moments as we face an uncertain 
future. How can we make sure that we’ll tell a meaningful story when the time to comes? 
 Together, these omissions begin a third story, and a third way of telling a story about the 
human condition. This is the story of the book, The Human Condition, of its place in the world, 
between its author and readers. This story begins as Arendt’s two omissions seem to fall into 
tension with the central theme and guiding proposition of the book. The theme is “what we are 
doing” and her proposition “to think what we are doing" (5). How can we know how to “think 
what we are doing” if we avoid discussing thinking and the Modern World, where we are 
presently doing? And yet, again: 
“What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are 
doing.” (HC 5) 
 Making sense of this tension between Arendt’s intention and her systematic method 
requires a different perspective from which to read her writing. Rather than understand her 
proposition as a general maxim, I would like to take this statement as a description of what 
Arendt intended to do in her writing and what she will ask us to do in our reading. By way of the 
book, we are going to think along with Arendt as she herself attempts to think what we are doing. 
This literal-minded interpretation may seem peculiar. Through it I mean to place Arendt’s 
proposition in the context of her own ideas. When we read any scholarly work, we generally 
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understand that our task is to carefully comprehend the author’s argument, or his or her point of 
view, so we can for a proper opinion about it. This kind of formal comprehension is not, at least 
not primarily, the recommended goal for approaching the The Human Condition. We will be 
thinking with the book and that will lead to a different sort of understanding. For Arendt, 
thinking and cognition are distinct and in many ways opposed mental processes: “Cognition 
always pursues a definite aim…once this aim is reached, the cognitive process has come to an 
end. Thought, on the contrary, has neither an end nor an aim outside itself, and it does not even 
produce results…”(170). The implication of this opposition in the guiding proposition of the 
book makes sense; understanding the differences between those mental processes, and how they 
blur in modern perceptions of thinking, is one of the permeating concerns of the book. 
 Her proposition to think indicates that Arendt wants us to read the book through our own 
shared context. We have to steer clear of the tendencies towards “thoughtlessness” symptomatic 
of the Modern World—“the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition 
of ‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty" (5). These trivial “truths” subdue the pain of 
our situation because they answer it. The book will not give us answers. Answering implies that 
the problems of our human condition matter only until we solve them, and afterwards can be 
discarded and forgotten. The proposition asks us to read in the conviction that if we let ourselves 
think about these problems, then the human human meaning they seem devoid of may appear to 
us. This rejection is not a withdrawal into a stone-faced stoicism. On the contrary, Arendt’s 
reconsiderations transpire from “the vantage point of our newest experiences and most recent 
fears” (5). The practice of thinking Arendt invites us to manifests when, we find ways to 
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articulate the perplexities of our common life as one possible “constellation” the human 
condition among the many other’s different eras have faced. 
 It is one thing to interpret this proposition, and another to actually follow through with it. 
For the reader, the general conundrum is that thinking, at least in an Arendtian sense, implies a 
mental activity withdrawn from external activities like reading. The goal of this project is to 
understand what it means to think what we are doing as we are reading. I will propose that 
Arendt invites us to imagine the possibility that we can bring the way we think to the way we 
read. She does this by finding ways to show her own thinking in her writing. So while the book 
is a rich collection theoretically related ideas, it also shows its readers the ways she arrived at 
those ideas.  
Introduction 
 Having glanced at The Human Condition’s very first pages, I would like to jump to the 
book’s final paragraphs, where Arendt reconsiders thought’s place in the Modern World. 
Thought, she tells us, may well be the most important activity of all. Though the fate of thinking 
has perhaps grown “irrelevant for the future of the world,” a world evermore unrecognizably 
reworked by scientific and technological artifice,“it is not irrelevant for the future of man” (HC 
324)., who will necessarily have to face that world. Thinking is both the most vulnerable of all 
human capacities and the one that in “the extent of sheer activity” (325). may surpass all others 
as the activity wherein we do the most. How we care for its vulnerability may very well 
determine the fate of human freedom. This final return to the subject of thought resounds and 
reminds us of Arendt’s initial proposition to think what we are doing. It tells us clearly, thinking 
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about the world does not end with the close of the book, the comprehension of its theories and 
the ability to summarize it. If we found in our reading some moment to think, we should bring 
that moment to the rest of our lives. But with the book ending on this note, we may very well ask 
how we can go about doing this. The answer doesn’t seem obvious. Besides, as Arendt reminds 
us in these last pages, thought was explicitly omitted from the book’s considerations. 
 Having heard the omission of thought from the beginning of the book in the appeal to it 
at the end, I want to lead us back around to the very center of the book—to Chapter 23 of 45, 
“The Permanence of the World and the Work of Art”, where strangely, Arendt does describe the 
activity of thinking. In this last chapter of the “Work” section, immediately before the section on 
“Action”, Arendt describes how works of art stand out from other objects due to their 
uselessness, durability, and ‘transfigurative’ fabrication process.These aspects make works of art 
exceptionally reflective of human life. Not because artworks sometimes picture human beings, 
but because they most clearly convey their immediate source in human thought. Arendt not only 
describes thinking in relationship to works of art, but in distinction to other mental capacities 
such as cognition and logical reasoning. Why does thought—previously omitted—emerge in her 
writing at this juncture, the very center of the book, in a discussion of the work of art? To answer 
this question, we have to rethink how we are reading The Human Condition. 
 The prologue, Chapter 23, and the conclusion of the book make up three connected 
moments where Arendt is concerned with thinking’s place in her book. These three moments are 
all the more conspicuous because the bulk of the book does not consider thinking. That said, the 
book is a product of thinking and as we saw, asks us to think. That being the case, we should in 
the course of our reading try to imagine what Arendt was doing when she was writing. 
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Presumably, she was trying to think what she was doing as she was writing. Our goal isn’t to 
know what she was thinking, but rather to keep in mind that we are reading a particular person’s 
attempt to do precisely what she asked us to do. We are reading a record of thought. Not a direct 
representation of a thought-process, but a thing that was made from a thoughtful care for the 
activity of thinking itself—and that seeks make something out of that care. From this 
perspective, we can begin to read The Human Condition as though it were one of those peculiar 
objects it describes: a work of art. As such, we should begin to reread the Human Condition from 
its center in Chapter 23. I will show that through the chapter’s description of works of art, Arendt 
takes a moment to show us what she has been doing as she has been writing her book: trying to 
make her thoughts appear in words. To understand how she shows this, we will need to find a 
way to look for the relationship between the way she writes, and what she writes about. Going on 
this way means moving away from a theoretical perspective of the text towards a poetic one. To 
make this move, we should start understanding a theoretical understanding of how and what 
Chapter 23 says and how it relates to the rest of the text. 
  In Section One, I will discuss Patchen Markell’s interpretation of Chapter 23 in his essay, 
“Arendt’s Work: The Architecture of the Human Condition” (2011). Afterwards, I will show how 
and why my interpretation of the chapter diverges from his. Markell’s way of reading the 
tensions and contradictions of The Human Condition has informed my own inquiry, and his 
thoughtful and complex argument is a helpful parallel interpretation of the significance that the 
book’s structure has for the book’s subjects. Markell’s analysis is interesting because he frames 
the book’s structural and stylistic features as representations of its theoretical concerns. On his 
account, the book’s tensions and contradictions serve to reinforce rather than weaken the theory 
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they attempt to describe because developments later in the book help reformulate the 
relationships that were drawn before them. Markell frames Chapter 23 as the most important 
structural member of the text, acting as a pivot where the book shifts between two contradictory 
modes of theoretical distinction. 
 In Section Two, I argue that Markell misses a chance to ask why the book’s structure, 
tensions and all, “performs” the theory contained within it because he assumes that these 
performances always serve to bolster Arendt’s theoretical considerations. By framing them as 
performances, his reading does work the book’s tensions into a theoretical system. However, it is 
his system, not Arendt’s. I show that for Arendt, theoretical and performative activities are in fact 
literally opposed. If we are going to say that Chapter 23 appears or acts in a certain way, than we 
must to take this opposition into account. If we do, we see that the chapter acts in an altogether 
strange and unsystematic manner; tangibly representing the work of art’s relationship to the 
world. 
 In Section Three, I look to The Life of The Mind to better understand the relationship 
between theorist and performer, and see how this relationship may impact our reading of Chapter 
23 and its relative opposition to the theoretical considerations of The Human Condition. Arendt 
represents the relationship between theoretical and performative perspectives through a contrast 
between theoretical and metaphorical language. The Life of the mind tells us that thinking 
appears in the world through metaphorical language. In this light of this later work, I argue that 
the the use of metaphorical language in Chapter 23 positions it as a tangible representation of 
thought’s movement into appearance. 
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 In Section Four, I identify Arendt’s use of the term transfiguration in Chapter 23, as a 
particular metaphor through which she describes the experience of thought’s movement into 
appearance. To understand her use of the term as metaphorical, I attempt a method Arendt makes 
use of in The Life of the Mind to uncover the meaning behind common philosophical terms— 
among them theory and metaphor—by “dissolving” them into their original context. 
 In Section Five, I continue my search for the presence and meaning of metaphorical 
language in Chapter 23 by considering Arendt’s notion of the close relationship between poetry 
and thinking. Though she positions works of poetry as physical objects like any other artwork, 
she consistently uses metaphorical language that seems to conflicts with her theoretical picture of 
how objects exist in the world. In showing this strain, Arendt tangibly represents poetry’s 
inherent closeness to thinking, and its fey physical existence. 
 Finally, in Section Six I will jump to a different but no less  illuminating genre of 
Arendt’s work: biography. Just as we have been trying to think what Arendt is doing as a thinker 
writing, in her astonishing profile on the life of Walter Benjamin, Arendt shows her own attempt 
think what another thinker and was doing when they wrote. She does this by attempting to 
describe his unique kind of poetic thinking. I will argue that the peculiar way Arendt makes her 
attempt to think along with Benjamin serves as a model for our own endeavor to think along with 
her. 
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I.  Complexity and contradiction in The Human Condition 
Such fundamental and flagrant contradictions rarely 
occur in second-rate writers; in the work of the great 
authors they lead into the very center of their work. 
-Hannah Arendt,  
The Human Condition 104-105  
 Patchen Markell’s essay is concerned with Arendt’s theory of work and the meaning of its  
placement between labor and action both in the layout of the book’s sections and the theoretical 
scheme that those sections describe. Markell wants to say that these two features intertwine and 
reflect each other, so that “what is true of work in Arendt, in other words––that it cannot fully be 
understood in terms of the masterful production of a solid object according to a plan laid out in 
advance––is also true of Arendt’s work" (PM 20). That is, Arendt situates the book as a worked 
object in the world it describes.  
 To show this, Markell’s reading deviates from framing the text as a “snapshot of Arendt’s 
theoretical position at a single moment in time" (20). Instead, he attempts to read the text as the 
“record” of its own making. Markell does this by reconsidering the text’s puzzling tendency to 
contradict itself as it proceeds. Markell focuses on the contradictions that come about as Arendt 
shifts between different methods of distinguishing between her concepts. On his reading, the 
presence of these shifts tell us that Arendt allows her work to remain “deeply and visibly marked 
by the twists and turns her thinking followed" (20). Rather than try to decide between these 
tensions in method, he wants to ask why Arendt left these contradictions in her finished product, 
and how their introduction may reflect her theory. 
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 From this processual standpoint, Markell argues that the “Work” section’s central 
placement in the scheme of the book reflects the concept of work’s centrality in Arendt’s theory. 
Further, he wants to say the converse: Arendt’s concept of work, along with its dynamic 
placement, is meant to represent the text as a piece of work in the world that it describes. Markell 
sees Chapter 23 as marking a turning point in Arendt’s own writing, where she shifts between 
two methods of theoretical distinction written in two different “tones" This shift becomes 
necessary to maintain the labor-work-action triad as the relationships between them grow 
tenuous. Markell first identifies what he calls “territorial” distinctions. Before Chapter 23, work 
serves as a sort of buffer between labor and action. Arendt builds up this buffer through 
distinctions between labor and work. But as Arendt sees work becoming more like labor in 
appearance—and thereby imperiling action’s distinction—she has to find a different way to 
define work’s distinction from other activities. This comes both structurally and theoretically 
through the work of art, as it recasts work as a bridge, rather than a buffer. Whereas the 
distinctions between labor and work were “territorial” in tone, the distinctions between work and 
action become “relational" 
 Markell’s position enters into a long debate between readers about how to systematize the 
The Human Condition’s various concepts and keywords. Markell points to ambiguities that arise 
from Arendt’s conflicting types of distinction. For example, how Arendt uses the concept of 
“location” to note spatial distinctions between private and public property seems to contradict 
how “location” distinguishes between the positions of labor, work, and action activities in the 
world. The relationship between these two senses becomes ambiguous because Arendt does not 
make it clear which sense of location outweighs the other. The debate centers around the 
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presence of such ambiguities in the text. Readers find it difficult to solve these ambiguities 
because the actual results of Arendt’s distinctions are often left unclear. While she describes the 
defining qualities of labor, work, and action in detail, she rarely tells us what particular activities 
falls into these types. Arendt does not use one type of distinction to show the differences between 
two things more concretely than another. Given the lack of specific examples, readers find it 
difficult to see how one type of distinction is more concrete in a particular instance than another.  
 Markell sees the stakes of this debate in how we navigate the relationships between the 
labor, work, and action sections, which for him are the three central parts of the book. These 
sections form the text’s central arc and end in a reconsideration of action, an activity historically 
impoverished of a serious theoretical treatment.  Though Arendt may distinguish action from 
labor and work, it seems stripped bare: “It is famously difficult…to secure agreement about just 
what Arendtian action is, but she seems perfectly clear about what it is not" (PM 16).  
 I’ll draw a quick picture of the confusion that a reader faces. For the most part, we can 
guess what activities fall under labor and work because they give tangible products that appear 
opposed: labor activities produce consumables necessary for us to survive, and work activities 
give us objects that endure nature. The products of action—speech and action—are ostensibly 
different. They are unlike products of labor because in the end they are not solely meant to keep 
us alive, but rather to show who we are and what we mean. Unlike products of work they do not 
endure nor are they reliable, because outside of their immediate appearance, their effects are 
uncertain. In this way, they are as fleeting and out of our hands as the consumables of labor. Just 
as a farmer is at the weather’s whim, actors and witnesses are at the uncertain whims of what 
others will do or how they will respond. So acting has some qualitative and experiential affinity 
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to laboring. But doesn’t acting also have an affinity to working? Both activities transcend 
necessity and both of their products are crafted from ideas. Action then seems to be a strange 
gelatinous mix of the qualities of labor and work and not a distinct activity.      
  The absence of a rigid system of distinction makes Arendt’s account impractical for 
someone hoping to save fragile action from blurring into labor and work. Because readers have 
faith that this couldn’t be the case, they try to explain which Arendt’s distinctions operate in the 
system of Arendt’s theory. Markell positions himself between two competing groups of readers: 
Those who read for “territorial” distinctions between labor, work, and action, and those who read 
for “conceptual” distinctions.    1
  The territorial reader privileges Arendt’s attempts to separate the three activities 
concretely, “each of which properly belongs to a separate domain, whose boundaries must be 
secured for the sake of resurrecting and preserving the especially fragile and valuable experience 
of action in particular" (16). The problem with territorial readings is that through them action 
appears to become irrelevant to the rest of human activity. If action only encompasses activities 
that transcend the realms of labor and work and enter into a realm of action and response, the 
category becomes practically unattainable to laborers and workers. 
  Other readers respond to this pitfall by trying to articulate Arendt’s separation of 
activities conceptually rather than concretely. For these readers, the ambiguity of her particular 
distinctions between labor, work, and action means their distinctions are between “‘attitudes’ or 
‘ideal types’ or useful ‘abstractions’” (17). meant to bring out the overlaps of labor, work, and 
action as they can be found in any activity. While this view is tempting for Markell, it falters at 
  To clarify, the opposition between “territorial” and  “conceptual” distinctions is not the same as the relationship 1
between “territorial” and “relational” distinctions, which Markell will argue is as operative to the book’s structure. 
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two key points. First, these readings often discount parts of the text where Arendt’s language is in 
fact very territorial. Second, these distinctions still read as territorial, now only replacing 
distinctions between concrete phenomena with distinctions between conceptual frameworks. 
 These two problems lead Markell to two questions that cannot be answered from either 
perspective. Both positions seem to discount evidence for the other by prioritizing either 
territorial or conceptual types of distinction, “but to do this is to miss the opportunity to ask 
about the significance of the coexistence, within a single text, of highly territorial formulations 
like these with others that cut against them" (PM 17). If we understand this kind of co-existence 
as an intentional element of the text, we can rethink the purpose of distinction itself, “whether 
the work performed by Arendt’s distinctions is always and only the work of separation, of 
establishing and enforcing impassable boundaries between spaces—whether those spaces are 
literal or figurative, concretely social or merely conceptual" (18). The different ways Arendt 
takes to distinguish and relate her “spaces” are as important, and perhaps independent from, the 
spaces themselves.  
 With this in mind, Markell proposes a “radical” rereading of the structural organization of 
the book’s three central chapters. He reframes the three not as a successive trio but as “the 
fraught conjunction of two different pairs of concepts––labor and work, and work and 
action" (18). The text conveys two different notions of work using two different “tones” of 
distinction. For Markell, the shift between these two notions of work anchors the text as a whole. 
When Arendt pairs work with labor, the relationship between them acts territorially to extricate 
and protect work from blurring into labor, even as it transgresses into the realm of action. But as 
the text proceeds to the “Action” section, the distinctions that Arendt describes become 
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“relational” to respect the importance of the world that work builds for the actions that take place 
within it.  
 Markell’s argument for the presence of this sort of shift, begins in a discussion of Section 
II of The Human Condition, “The Public and the Private Realm" Generally, every object 
(whether tangible or conceptual) spoken about in The Human Condition is said to have a 
particular location in the world in relation to other objects. These locations are a basic way for us 
separate one thing from another. The location of the “private” would be somewhere not in the 
“public" How we should treat this location is left ambiguous. Markell compares two opposing 
characterizations Arendt gives us of the ancient understanding of the private-public divide. First 
he points to Arendt’s focus on the “privation” of privacy as a territorial sense of its location: “the 
sense that to live a private life, a life without action or outside the polis, meant to be ‘deprived of 
something’ of the highest value" (25).  Here, what private life lacks compared to public life 2
determines its relative location the public.   
 But he notices that the section shifts in tone as Arendt moves from discussing private and 
public activities to private and public property. As the divisions between the private and public 
become literally concrete, separated by walls, their respective locations distinguish them 
relationally. Arendt writes: “Originally, property meant no more or less than to have one’s 
location in a particular part of the world and therefore to belong to the body politic, that is, to be 
the head of one of the families which together constituted the public realm" (HC 61). The private 
becomes constitutional to the public because it makes stepping out into the polis possible: “A 
 That is, Deprived of public appearance, and the chance to be remembered. Markell quotes from chapter 6 “The 2
Rise of the Social”: “In ancient feeling the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the word itself, was all-important; it 
meant literally a state of being deprived of something, and even of the highest and most human of man’s capacities. 
A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the public realm, or like the 
barbarian had chosen not to establish such a realm, was not fully human" (37).
!17
location in this sense is an inner enclosure but it also has an exterior, publicly visible face, and 
the citizen who has a location regularly departs from it, indeed the function of that exterior,” of 
its defining walls, “is to connect the private to the public and so to make the departure and return 
possible" (PM 27). Here, the separate location of private dwellings allows for the possibility of 
public activities. 
 By showing the relationship between property and activity, Markell’s approach applies 
location’s relational distinction of public and private property to location’s territorial distinction 
of public and private activities. In particular, his reading opens up how we can interpret the 
“deprivation” of privacy. For example, we can reconsider the experience of this deprivation not 
only as a separation, but as a force that brings us to engage in public activities. Markell shows 
how this shift might impact our reading of another territorial instance of location when Arendt 
writes at the end of the section that “each human activity points to its proper location in the 
world" (HC 73). Here, particular activities “point” to their location not only relative to the 
private or public realms, but to their proper assignment in the categories of labor, work or action. 
Markell wants to show that the “relational” sense of location that preceded this second territorial 
sense, makes the nature of this “pointing” ambiguous: “these locations may serve as much to 
relate activities as to separate them, indeed even to facilitate movement across their 
boundaries" (27). That is, perhaps from the distinct point of view of doing one activity, we may 
see its relationship to other activities in other categories. 
 Markell rereads the purpose of territorial distinctions between activities through the 
relational distinctions that arises between physical spaces. He uses this rereading as a model for 
distinguishing between two senses of work present in the book. In his view, Arendt distinguishes 
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work territorially through the instrumental character of the fabrication process. In the ‘Work’ 
section Arendt tells us that this process begins with a collection of means that are organized, 
through planning and workmanship, for the production of a useful end. Quoting Arendt, Markell 
writes that “the activity of work has as its terminus and as its purpose a “piece of work,” an 
independent entity that will subsist after the activity has been completed" (28). On his account, 
instrumentality at first seems to fundamentally separate work activities from labor activities, 
securing the independence of the manmade world from nature. Work objects “subsist” without 
the need for constant maintenance, they’re presence disrupts the cyclical processes of nature, 
giving the human world a sense of objective permanence.   
  Soon after introducing instrumentality, Arendt reveals its fatal side effect. As soon as 
use-objects are introduced into and become part of the world, they quickly become means for 
new ends and new objects. The problem of instrumentality is not that work is or will become a 
sort of laboring, but that instrumentality hinders our ability to adequately see the differences 
between labor and work in experience, as doers and spectators of either. Work becomes described 
as a sort of laboring. As our capacity to transform the natural world has increased, people have 
begun to live most of their lives in a fabricated world. Thus, an experience of natural labor has 
been replaced with a fabricated labor. For example, we do the work jobs demand not necessarily 
to introduce new things into the world, but as a means to exist in society. As Markell puts it, this 
fabricated labor infuses work “with a vicious circularity that mimics the natural circularity of 
biological life" (28). So, work’s fundamental distinction from labor imperils it: It becomes 
experienced just as we would natural labor. Except now, our labors do not relate us to but further 
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alienate us from the Earth.  At the same time, the world loses its sense of permanence and 3
objectivity: objects are not made to last, but to be worn down, to make way for other objects. The 
danger is a loss of the locating power of the world, its ability to “relate and separate” and thus 
give rise to the public realm.  So the territorial distinction between labor and work also imperils 4
the possibility of action. 
 Markell frames Arendt’s injection of works of art into the world of use objects as a sort of 
“relational” remedy. Among manmade objects, works of art have a singular ability to re-describe 
and reaffirm the distinctiveness of work, free from their self-defeating instrumental character. 
The work of art’s ambiguous location among activities allows Arendt to disentangle work from 
labor, securing Arendt’s theoretical picture. At the same, her discussion implies that activities 
where we engage with art works provide a practical way to combat the corrosive effects of 
instrumentality. 
 Markell first notices this ambiguous location at the level of style. What marks “The 
Permanence of the World and the Work of Art” from the previous five chapters in the “Work” 
section is that it “strains towards the vocabulary of the ‘Action’ [section]” (27). For Markell, its 
central moves “anticipate the language of layering and intertwining” (32). that will come to 
 For Arendt, the consequences of this alienation are immense, for “The earth is the very quintessence of the human 3
condition, and earthly nature, for all we know, may be unique in the universe in providing human beings with a 
habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and without artifice" (2). To forget our relationship to the 
Earth does not only mean to forget our mortality, but the essential root of our natality: “without the articulation of 
natality, we would be doomed to swing forever in the ever-recurring cycle of becoming, then without the faculty to 
undo what we have done and to control at least partially the processes we have let loose, we would be the victims of 
an automatic necessity bearing all the marks of the inexorable laws which, according to the natural sciences before 
our time, were supposed to constitute the outstanding characteristic of natural processes" (246).
 Arendt describes this sudden loss through analogy: “What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number 4
of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather 
them together, to relate and to separate them. The weirdness of this situation resembles a spiritualistic séance where 
a number of people gathered around a table might suddenly, through some magic trick, see the table vanish from 
their midst, so that two persons sitting opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely 
unrelated to each other by anything tangible" (53). 
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describe action. by edging into the sort of vocabulary that will describe the distinct activity of 
acting, the section “performs the very intertwining it describes" (32). While his essay lacks 
particular examples of this intertwining vocabulary, Markell sees a theoretical bridge between 
works of art and action. Public appearance rather than use or exchange value is essential to the 
enactment both of art works and actions. In one sense, this seems to distinguish the fabrication of 
art works territorially from the fabrication of use and exchange objects, bringing the work of art 
closer to the higher realm of action. However, the distinction of artworks from use-objects 
conflicts with a sentence in Chapter 23 that, for Markell, acts as the pivot of the entire book: “To 
be sure, an ordinary use object is not and should not be intended to be beautiful; yet whatever has 
a shape at all and is seen cannot help being either beautiful or ugly, or something in-
between" (HC 172-173). Markell takes this sentence to show that “the idea of the “work of art” 
has ceased to represent a discrete domain of aesthetically significant objects, and has become 
nothing more than a vivid exemplification of a phenomenon (indeed, of a phenomenality). that 
pervades the world of ordinary use-objects too" (35). For Markell, lack of use and exchange 
values does distinguish the work of art from other objects, but the pivotal sentence recasts that 
distinction as relational. Uselessness opposes use, not by drawing a dividing line, but rather by 
drawing us to a certain distance away from other objects in the world, so that we may see them in 
a new light. In his concluding remarks, Markell points to an overall practical conclusion we can 
derive from this shift in work’s distinction: 
Arendt is saying something stronger than this: that the instrumental purpose of a course of 
activity—its use, you might say—is, when properly understood, never merely instrumental, but 
implicates larger questions about, as Arendt would later say,“how [the world] is to look” and 
“what kind of things are to appear in it” (Arendt 2006, 220 [223]). Action emerges when we 
confront and are provoked into speech and deed by these larger questions as they present 
themselves in some “worldly, objective reality” (1958, 182).  
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 A practice of considering “how the world is supposed to look” begins by noticing what it 
looks like. We can begin this practice when we engage with works of art, because their fragile 
and sensible, rather than instrumental nature, disposes them for judgments which because of our 
taste we cannot help but have. Having turned our eyes to these exceptional objects, we may turn 
back to the rest of the world of things and ask similar questions with a similar sensitivity. That is, 
if we can see objects apart from their instrumentality, perhaps we can see instrumentality as a 
similarly malleable thing. Just as Chapter 23 takes us from “Work” to “Action” through the work 
of art, the work we do when we engage with artworks leads us from the world into the web of 
human relationship, the public realm of speech and action, that may change world it forms 
around for the better. For Markell, the book performs this entrance into action though its 
organizational structure, by contrasting two opposed ways of distinction, each allowing for the 
meaning of the other to open forth to us.  
 I have tried my best to give full account of Markell’s interpretation. The intertwining 
opposition between territorial and relational distinctions generates a theoretical picture of 
Arendt’s thinking that incorporates, rather than ignores, the book’s twists and turns. In one sense 
this picture reflects the very public realm Arendt describes. Markell’s interpretation tells us that 
the book’s many subjects—location, activity, space, etc. are fundamentally connected through a 
plurality of perspectives that see those subjects in different ways. These subjects “relate and 
separate” the perspectives that gather around them, just as objects in the world around which we 
gather “relate and separate” us, preventing us from “falling over each other, so to speak" (HC 
52). In framing the book this way, Markell shows a way in which The Human Condition not only 
means to explain a worldview to the reader, but to act as an example of how to take into account 
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many ways of seeing. With this in mind, I would like to account for another way of seeing that I 
think is essential to the text, and that from its theoretical vantage point, Markell’s essay does not 
see. 
II.  Performance 
 On Markell’s account, The Human Condition’s stylistic and structural features perform 
Arendt’s theory. He uses the notion of performance frequently in his essay. He describes Arendt’s 
two senses of work as an attempt to “reintegrate human activity understood instrumentally and 
human activity understood as meaningful performance. ”(PM 19). He speaks of performance in 
another way to describe Arendt’s own work. “Formally,” that is to say in appearance “work 
seems to be the concept with the closest connection to Arendt’s own theoretical activity: as a 
boundary-setter and wall-builder, Arendt herself performs something analogous to what homo 
faber performs with stone and wood" (23). He also describes the structural function of Arendt’s 
concepts as performative: A reliance on territorial distinctions makes “it difficult for work to 
perform the structural task Arendt had set for it" (28). Yet again, he refers to performance in 
characterizing Chapter 23, which “with respect to the structure of The Human Condition as a 
written work…performs the intertwining it describes" (32). In these four instances, Markell uses 
performance in four completely different ways. In the first instance, work is a performance that 
makes meaning appear. In the second, Arendt’s theoretical activity performs in the sense that it 
looks like the activity of a worker—not an artist but a “boundary setter" In the third, the concept 
of work cannot perform a task properly. Finally chapter 23 textually “performs” the theoretical 
intertwinement of Action and Work.  
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 Markell’s essay attempts to draw symmetries between the book’s stylistic (e.g. fourth 
instance). and structural (e.g. third instance). features and its theoretical concerns (e.g. first and 
second instances). Performance keeps coming up to describe what these features are doing—yet 
there is no indication of what unifies them. Because of this, the meaning of the term conflicts 
across the levels of the book that he wants to intertwine. Is performance the performance of a 
task, or a performance that makes something appear? If Arendt’s theoretical activity performs 
like a worker, is it because Arendt works, or because she’s trying to show what work is. If she is 
trying to show what work is, then is this show meant to perform one of the book’s rhetorical or 
structural tasks? If so, then isn’t this meaningful, communicative, performance not made to show 
itself, but to be an instrument holding together the larger structure of the book? If so, then 
Arendt’s representation of a meaningful performance turns out to perform instrumentally—
precisely a static view of objects that on Markell’s account she finds works of art mean to resist 
and reframe. 
 I appreciate Markell’s method as a way to begin incorporating the book’s compositional 
intricacies into our conception of what Arendt says, and I agree that in style and structure she 
does in some sense perform what she wants to speaks about. Markell makes the mistake of 
assuming that these performances always serve to elucidate a strictly theoretical concern. For his 
purposes, Markell may not be concerned with the meaning of the word “performance" But a care 
for the many senses words take is essential to Arendt’s methods of inquiry and writing; we have 
to read her with a similar care. He does not ask what Arendt might think a performance is. This 
betrays the fact that he does not consider what Arendt might think theory is. If we do, we quickly 
see that his assumption is untenable. In fact, For Arendt performative activity is literally  
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opposed to theoretical activity. His notion of “meaningful performance” describes how works of 
art define the category of work. Works of Art perform by making meaning appear to us—an 
audience. The most obvious sense of an artwork that performs is a performance; a play; theater. 
Throughout her work, Arendt points out this lasts word’s shared root with theory in ancient 
Greek théātron meant a theater, or gathering place, and takes its root from the verb theáomai, 
meaning to observe, watch, view—to spectate, as theatai—spectators—do. The theorist 
contemplates the world the way a spectator watches a performance; still and from a distance.  5
 In arguing for Chapter 23’s functions and fits into the structure he overlays onto the 
whole book, Markell doesn’t spend enough time working through the ways in which Chapter 23, 
with its peculiar ideas, style, and its structural position, might not relate, nor be supposed to 
relate, to a theoretical system. If we call Chapter 23 the center of a performance, an enactment of 
an idea, then we have to say that the chapter does something distinctly non-theoretical. This is 
not to say that Arendt throws theory out, nor that a theoretical vantage gives us wrong answers. 
In the chapter, Arendt does describe what she thinks works of art are, and where they fit into the 
world. We should take these descriptions seriously while also keeping in mind that there must be 
a reason why she couches them in a performance—that is, language that methodically opposes 
them. We ought to ask how these performances illuminate the work of art in a way that theory 
couldn’t have. If the chapter’s structural and stylistic features act as tangible representations that 
mimic works of art—then what else could these features be but works of art? If this is the case, 
we should consider what Arendt meant these performances to do, given an understanding of what 
Arendt says—from a theoretical view—works of art do and how they appear in the world. 
 In the next section, we’ll see an example of this etymological reading in The Life of the Mind.5
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 Having said this, some might ask if we really should isolate the chapter from the rest of 
the book. The performance that takes place in the chapter is not only its own, but part of a larger 
body of work. Such a performance could still be part of theoretical structure of the book, because 
not the chapter, but the theory as a whole is the final product of Arendt’s work. Because Arendt’s 
whole theoretical picture includes a performative element, than those features can have both a 
structural function and reflect the entire book, not just a single chapter, as itself a work of art. On 
this view, the basic premises of Markell’s argument still stand. There is no Chapter 23 without 
the rest of The Human Condition. The converse also works if we say with Markell that Chapter 
23 acts as the keystone or turning point of the entire book. Like the composition of a painting, 
the book as a whole frame and the chapter as a focal element are intertwined and self-contained.  
 As we saw earlier, Markell’s account relates two parallel senses of structure: theoretical 
and textual. For him, Arendt’s theoretical picture is formed concentrically out from its center: the 
work of art helps maintain the distinctiveness of work, the category of activities that mediates the 
labor-work-action triad that make up our common human capacities. Arendt “performs” this 
theoretical hierarchy textually by organizing the book’s contents concentrically: The three 
sections dealing with the triad make up the middle three of five sections; the “Work” section 
makes up the middle of those section; while Chapter 23 is the middle chapter of the book, and 
lies between the “Work” and “Action” sections. We can agree that Chapter 23 reframes the 
category of work by introducing a class of objects (art works). that are useless and only meant to 
appear. But Markell doesn’t consider the reasons why, for Arendt, this distinct type of appearance 
can have any effect on human experience at all. Arendt tells us quite explicitly: “The immediate 
source of the art work is the human capacity for thought” (HC 168). If we are to understand what 
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art works do, and where they fit into the world, we must understand their relationship to 
thinking.  
 Markell’s essay entirely ignores this relationship. We could try to picture the “capacity 
for thought” as the next concentric layer within works of art. But if we do so, the scheme quickly 
degrades. At the very center of the labor-work-action triad is an activity that none of its activities 
relate to: thought is a mental activity, and does not even take place in the same realm (that is, 
physical space). as the other activities. Further, for Arendt thought is not even strictly involved in 
the fabrication of works of art. She writes: “The thought process by itself no more produces and 
fabricates tangible things, such as books, paintings, sculptures, or compositions, than usage by 
itself produces and fabricates houses and furniture" (169). Finally, we already know that Arendt 
“systematically” omitted thought from her considerations, limiting them to labor, work, and 
action.  
 Chapter 23 and the work of art—stand apart from the world of the human condition, like 
conspicuous strangers in the text. However, Chapter 23 does lie at the center of the text, and at 
the center of Arendt’s systematically organized considerations. The position of this stranger point 
to its significance—perhaps not as a key structural moment in a theory about the world, but as a 
moment in a story about this position, that is, about thought’s relationship to works of art as it 
manifests there. The story of thinking in The Human Condition begins with a call to it in the 
prologue; then a systematic omission of it from discussion; then in Chapter 23, its puzzling 
reappearance for a few brief pages in the very middle of the system that it was excluded from; 
then another recession from view, and finally, its return and release in the reaffirmation of the 
book’s initial proposition that we should think what we are doing. 
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 With this said, we still need to ask how Arendt performs the relationship between thought 
and the work of art, and why a purely theoretical treatment of this relationship could not suffice. 
Why must the work of art be enacted to be understood? To answer this, we need to understand 
how, for Arendt, the work of art and thought become close, and why neither of them can be 
grasped from a theoretical perspective. In the next section we will see that the thought 
communicates itself into the world through metaphorical language, and how this communication 
stands apart from theoretical language. 
III.  Metaphor and thinking what we are doing 
How Ludicrous these efforts to translate 
Into one’s private tongue a public fate! 
Instead of poetry divinely terse, 
Disjointed notes, Insomnia’s mean verse! 
-John Shade, Pale Fire (231-234). 
(a.k.a Vladimir Nabokov). 
Chapter 23 describes the work of art through a performance that tangibly expresses, or 
“reifies,” what it attributes to the work of art. This union of form and content can only mean that 
Chapter 23 is itself a work of art. Understanding this, we ought to reconsider how we can and 
cannot speak about the chapter. How we speak about the chapter will determine how we can see 
it. Because the chapter speaks about the work of art, it speaks to what it itself is doing and can 
do. This reflexive position has two implications. First, as a work of art, the chapter speaks to us 
by appearing—not by accurately or explicitly stating what works of art are, or what it is; but 
rather through the sheer composition of its words and phrases, making its meaning 
communicable to us. What this composition says by appearing is not yet either true or untrue—it 
simply is there—and we’re here, looking at it. Secondly, like all works of art, the chapter shows 
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its immediate source in thought. Artworks rarely have thought as their subject. Rather, for Arendt 
the final product points out, in an unspoken way, the path it took from the mind of the artist out 
into appearance. Among artworks then, Chapter 23’s subject is peculiar. It is about the work of 
art and its journey from thought. As such thought appears twice and intertwined: written about as 
an explicit part of chapter’s subject, and emergent in the chapter itself as an object. 
This may opens up a question of priority: which came first, the theory of the work of art 
or the performance? I think we should refrain from this line of questioning. Not because there 
isn’t an answer, but because the answer is not the point. What matters is how Chapter 23, this 
thing, appears. We have to ask how it appears to see how it shows Arendt’s 
thinking. This means moving away from asking for what purpose Arendt made it appear, why its 
true, and how to fit it into what we know. These questions may have answers, and may lead to 
fruitful judgments. But we ask them from the perspective of a theorist, I hope to show another 
way to approach our reading, one which abstains from questions of theory, so we can give the 
text some independence. By independence, I mean a recognition of what is un-relatable in the 
text, or rather, only relates to itself. Why we should abstain from these questions will only 
become apparent after we begin to do so. abstaining from questions of theory requires a 
suspension of disbelief—or, in positive terms, it requires trust. After a sketch of this way of 
reading, I would like to look at some evidence from The Life of the Mind, where she points to the 
possibilities and limits of this sort of reading.
For the moment,  all we know is that Arendt wrote this chapter and gave it to us to read. 
If she meant it to be a work of art—and that would mean a work of art as she describes such—
then we should listen to her when she writes that "Thought is related to feeling and transforms its 
mute and inarticulate despondency...until [it is] fit to enter the world and to be transformed into 
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things, to become reified" (HC 168). The heart of this chapter is not a torsional bridge between 
opposed methods; it’s a feeling—a “passionate intensity” that may have once swirled about 
Arendt’s inner life. What is this feeling? I don’t know, we cannot know. This does not mean it 
does not live in the text. Feeling is mute, inarticulate, and despondent. Arendt’s words tell us that 
feeling is irrelevant to the world because it cannot convey itself into appearance. What can be 
conveyed is a story, implicit or explicit, of what one thought when they found themselves 
feeling. This story only promises that there once was a feeling, and the promise is fulfilled when 
we who receive the story choose to trust it. 
So as we read this chapter, we have to understand that its root feeling is hidden and was 
not meant to be pried out. Read from this perspective, we see that the chapter requires us to take 
part in its enactment. In charging us with this role, Arendt opposes her readers to the perspective 
of the theorist. If only for a moment, we are asked to act with the text. Arendt points to this 
opposition explicitly in the chapter “Thinking and doing: the spectator” in The Life of the Mind, 
where she writes that as a spectator, “you may understand the truth of what the spectacle is 
about; but the price you have to pay is withdrawal from participating in it" (LM 93). This late 
book sought to reconsider three mental activities in three parts: “Thinking,” “Willing,” and the 
unwritten “Judging" For Arendt, these activities have in common a “peculiar quiet, absence of 
any doing or disturbances, the withdrawal from involvement [and partiality.]” (92). Arendt asks 
after the “region of withdrawal” particular to each mental activity. Arendt uses the term 
withdrawal to call to a movement of attention from the common world of appearance, if only 
temporarily, toward a private one. Considering these regions is essential for her, because they are 
the places from which, after having thought, willed, or judged, we return to the world. 
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Arendt traces the activity of spectating from its roots in Greek culture, from Pythagoras 
to Plato and Aristotle, to its importance in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Historically, spectating is 
often described as representative of the opposition between thinker and actor. However, Arendt 
notes that this scission has roots in a much more particular situation. As was mentioned earlier, 
our word theory comes from the greek word for spectators, theatai, which also gives us theater. 
As Arendt has it, the opposition of spectator and playactor does not describe an opposition 
between thinker and actor, but between actor and judge.
Where “the spectator occupies a position that enables him to see the whole play-as the 
philosopher is able to see the kosmos as a harmonious ordered whole The actor, being 
part of the whole, must enact his part in it…he is bound to the particular that finds its 
ultimate meaning and the justification of its existence solely as a constituent of a 
whole" (LM 94-95).
Just as the theatergoer’s position allows him to see the “meaning of the whole play,” the 
judge, or theorist, withdraws to the impartial position required to make fair judgements of a 
situation or spectacle, and the actors taking part in it. But in this position the “price you have to 
pay” is separation from the “harmonious ordered whole” that you can see. This also means that 
you give up the experience of being a part; of being bound, of searching for meaning, and of 
striving to make an appearance. Judgement’s region of withdrawal “is clearly located within our 
ordinary world” (LM 97)., but situated at that world’s edges, where we watch its spectacle 
proceed. However, the locality of where we withdraw when we are willing or thinking is far 
more obscure. The problem is that these activities are not occupied by what has appeared, but to 
what hasn’t, “such everyday thought-things as justice, liberty or courage, that are nevertheless 
totally outside sense experience" (LM 97). The objects of thinking are the invisible “thought-
things” that we may imagine, point out in visible things, but can never reliably see.
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With this term, we can see a path back to Chapter 23, where Arendt tells us that “Works 
of art are thought-things, but this does not prevent their being things” (HC 168-169). Not only 
works of art, but works of philosophy are thought-things. In the Life of the Mind, Arendt tells us 
that we “sense” thought-things through our mental capacities. They are invisible, imaginary, or 
otherwise hoped-for things at we “see” with our mind’s eye.  among objects, works of art seem 6
to have a dual location. They are tangible objects, related to us through our eyes and ears. 
Nonetheless, their forms reach into and signify the intangible. For Arendt, this reciprocal 
communication occurs because all thought-things are formed by and couched in metaphorical 
language.
Arendt tells us that“metaphor achieves the “carrying over” -metapherein- of a genuine 
and seemingly impossible metabasis eis allo genos, the transition from one existential state, that 
of thinking, to another, that of being an appearance among appearances and this can be done only 
by analogies" (LM 103). Just as the term “theory” has roots in the image of a spectator watching 
a play, the term “metaphor” has roots in the task of carrying something across a distance. Both 
terms convey the inwardly-sensed experience of a mental activity, through the analogy of an 
everyday activity. 
“Theory” and “Metaphor” are philosophical terms and for Arendt all such terms are 
already essentially metaphorical. A term’s metaphorical meaning “discloses itself when we 
dissolve it into its original context, which must have been vividly in the mind of the first 
philosopher to use it” (103). This is an example of where Arendt distinguishes between the 
search for meaning and the search for truth. The philosopher uses language to give an account of 
 c.f. Chapter 13 of Thinking “Metaphor and the Ineffable” Arendt tells us that “All mental activities, driven to 6
language as the only medium for their manifestation, each draw their metaphors from a different bodily 
sense….from the outset of formal philosophy, thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing…” (LM 110). Willing 
has traditionally been associated with hearing, and judgment with tasting.
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a general truth apprehended in his or her own thinking. The only reason that the philosopher’s 
language smacks of the truth—can be shared and spoken about—is that it has meaning to others. 
Standing apart from the idea, this meaning relates the inner experience of sensing the idea 
through an analogous everyday or sense experience—an everyday that all people, no matter how 
lost in thought, originate from and share in. 
This meaning can only “disclose itself” when “we” readers, viewers, spectators, thinkers, 
“dissolve” the term into its original context. This is an assertion of method. We understand the 
meaning of a term when we imagine what it was like to engage in an activity; for example of 
sitting in the quiet rows of an amphitheater. That is to say, when we think what the philosopher 
was doing. This tangible thing must have been “vividly” in the mind of the philosopher. Vivid, 
because when the philosopher used the term, he or she wasn’t watching a spectacle or carrying a 
sack, but was writing or speaking, to himself or herself, or to a friend. Excited by the wild inner 
movement of thought, but lost for words, the philosopher surrendered to simile, a ‘sort-of-like,’ 
and remembered something—something everyday, memorable, and yet gleaming now with a 
new glow. So, to “dissolve” a term into its context, doubly means to imagine what is was like for 
the philosopher to have remembered and rediscovered something in a new way—and then, of 
course to have shared it. 
The experience of thought is the need for communicability, what Arendt calls, an “urge to 
speak,” to release ideas from the overlapping, unending circularity of thought and feeling—of a 
soul (psyche). that feels, and a mind (nous). that thinks.  We can understand this urge to 
appearance as a desire to enact what we feel present inwardly yet outwardly absent. Following 
Arendt, this desire, commonly shared yet felt individually, is simply the desire for our thought’s 
be a part of the world by making sense in it.
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Having thought through all of this, perhaps we ought not to make a hard distinction 
between how the thinker and theorist each read; the regions that each withdraws to may not be 
mutually exclusive. The theorist made a choice to withdraw into impartiality and “paid the price” 
of renouncing action in the world. But the theorist never actually leaves the world, he or she only 
stands at its edges, related to it by a line of sight. Couldn’t we imagine that, from this withdrawn 
location, the theorist might withdraw still further into the region of thought? That is, might he or 
she think what they are doing? Feel and wonder about the choice they have made? That is, might 
they think, or imagine, what it would be like to be a part of spectacle?  
IV.  The work of art and transfiguration 
 Chapter 23 begins with a discussion of works of art and their outstanding permanence in 
the world of things. Arendt describes a series of “transformations” that lead to a work of art. This 
series falls into the basic scheme by which all objects are made: A human capacity, for thought, 
usage, or “trucking and bartering” (exchanging,). transforms a “passionate intensity” into an idea 
that may enter the world by way of actual workmanship. Likewise, thought transforms inner 
feeling into a shape fit for the world, and hands this shape, this mental sketch, into an artist’s 
craftsmanship. Unlike the human capacities for exchanging and using, thinking, which is for 
Arendt “immediate source” of art works, does not act in the world. Thought, intangible and 
invisible, can never itself appear. Somehow through the artist’s fabrication invisible thought does 
manifest in the world—But how does something invisible actually become visible? What does 
thought look like?  
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 Arendt distinguishes the process of reification that leads to an art work as as not only a 
transformation of materials but a “transfiguration" I will try to show that this small semantic 
distinction illustrates the distinctly metaphorical existence of works of art. That is, its existence 
as both thing and thought-thing, communicating the inner experiences of the mind into the world 
of appearances. Arendt uses “Transfiguration” as a metaphor to describe the inner experience we 
feel when we witness this seemingly impossible communication. But if we follow what Arendt 
did with theory and metaphor and “dissolve” transfiguration “into its original context”, we won’t  
find an everyday activity at all, but instead something miraculous. 
 Arendt first describes transfiguration as “a veritable metamorphosis in which it is as 
though the course of nature which wills that all fire burn to ashes is reverted and even dust can 
burst into flames" (168). This mysterious image alludes to Rilke’s poem Magie. Though Arendt 
describes the distinctiveness of artistic reification through the image, from a purely theoretical 
perspective the phrase alone tells us very little, and Arendt does not explain how the image 
corresponds to reality. We should consider how the silence surrounding the image relates to the 
imagery itself. The image does not correspond to reality, in the same way that dust bursting into 
flame does not correspond to anything real—it corresponds only to what is unreal, impossible, 
but nonetheless imaginable and speakable. As much as we might want, nature’s processes cannot 
be reverted, time cannot turn backwards, and life cannot spring from death. But when these 
reversals are rendered in words or images that can then be remembered and pictured in our 
minds, it is “as though,” at least in some realm, they were possible.  
 Beginning with thought and ending in workmanship, the reification of works of art gives 
shape to our inward and intertwined highest hopes and deepest despairs, not so they can be 
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fulfilled or dispelled—works of art cannot reliably do that—but so that they may be seen and 
shared in beautiful things. Previously we saw that artworks allow, if not a total escape, an 
alternative to an “instrumental” definition of manmade objects. Now we see that their inherent 
publicity allows for an alternative way of approaching our invisible thoughts and uncontrollable 
feelings. 
   In common usage, the differences between the words transformation and transfiguration 
are slight in sound and meaning. Both words refer to a change in form, and a “metamorphosis" 
But if we consider the original meaning of transfiguration we’ll see it both reflects and clarifies 
what Arendt means by the term. A transformation turns one thing into another by fundamentally 
altering its form, shape, character, condition, function, or nature.  A thing is altered to become 7
something else, to be given a different name. For Arendt, the worker transforms raw material into 
an artificial form. This transformation implies an unavoidable violence upon (135). nature, which 
is destroyed in conversion to something new and valuable. On the other hand, transfiguration 
seems a much softer change. In transfiguration, a thing’s original material remains through to the 
end; somehow what has changed is only its appearance.  8
 Transfiguration has roots in the miraculous. The particular miracle, Jesus’ Transfiguration 
on the Mountain from Matthew:17, serves as a wonderfully illuminating allegory—albeit I have 
no idea if it is explicitly related—to Arendt’s use of the word in Chapter 23. The story professes 
the most intense revelation— divinity showing and announcing itself on Earth. But the moment 
is fleeting and its audience is intimate. Fleeting, so that as soon as one turned away, it was as 
"transformation, n" OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017. Web. April 2017.7
  "transfiguration, n" OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017. Web. April 2017.8 8
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though nothing had ever changed. Did anything change? Nothing but the eyes and ears of a small 
group of witnesses stirred to an appearance arising and disappearing out from nowhere.The 
passage, quoted from The Authorized Kings James Version, reads as follows: 
 And after six days Jesus taketh Peter, James, and John his brother, and bringeth 
them up into an high mountain apart, 2 and was transfigured before them: and his face 
did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light. 3 And, behold, there appeared 
unto them Moses and Elias talking with him. 4 Then answered Peter, and said unto Jesus, 
Lord, it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles; one for 
thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias. 5 While he yet spake, behold, a bright cloud 
overshadowed them: and behold a voice out of the cloud, which said, This is my beloved 
Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye him. 6 And when the disciples heard it, they fell 
on their face, and were sore afraid. 7 And Jesus came and touched them, and said, Arise, 
and be not afraid. 8 And when they had lifted up their eyes, they saw no man, save Jesus 
only. 9 And as they came down from the mountain, Jesus charged them, saying, Tell the 
vision to no man, until the Son of man be risen again from the dead. 
 The passage tells us that transfiguration is not a change of material but of transparency: 
“his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light" Like light, which is of all 
things, most invisible, intangible, and clarifying. This could only have been said in simile (“as 
the light”). because it could not be said what this shining white really was. It was not as the way 
things are; though it did become clear in the way that things appear. What was invisible within 
Jesus became apparent on his body. His skin remains skin and his clothes remain clothes but both 
are now seen and described different way. The transparency of transfiguration allows for an 
object’s intangible qualities to be introduced onto its tangible qualities, so that even if a thing 
may appear opaque, its opaqueness is given qualities of translucency. In this way, we can 
describe transfiguration as a movement outwards from the unknown heart of something onto its 
visible surface. The Transfiguration was a fleeting sight, yet it showed a beauty that was always 
within Jesus and would remains afterwards. Having shimmered into view, it could now rest in 
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the memory of others. From that new place it has been evidently been reimagined, and put down 
in words. 
 Remembrance implies a responsibility to remember well. What was shown was 
untouchable and touched nothing. To remember that requires a particular way or practice of 
remembering. In Mathew 18:9, Christ charges his apostles to secrecy: “tell the vision to no man, 
until the Son of Man be risen again from the dead" That is: Do not put what you saw to use, not 
even to stop my death. The mystery that transfiguration reveals must remain a mystery even 
when it is given a form as clear as day. To contrive transfiguration would be to transform it into 
something it is not, in effect forgetting what it really was. Transfiguration creates nothing, does 
nothing, and explains nothing of what nevertheless shines through it. At the same time, this 
intangibility, this thing-less-ness, is what let the transfiguration occur, because it was what 
journeyed out into appearance. The mystery conveyed in transfiguration, the least thing-like 
thing, is fragile and must be cared, maintained as a mystery. 
 Transfiguration is the communication of the intangible into the tangible, the permanent 
into the fleeting and fragile—a communication that implies and illuminates a responsibility to 
the unknown. In chapter 23, Arendt tells us that through works of art the “very stability of the 
human artifice” becomes apparent. This stability is a thought-thing, and does not normally 
appear in the world of things, “which being inhabited and used by mortals can never be absolute" 
(HC 168). What we do in and with the world changes how we can see it. Because almost all 
things we make get used up, our awareness and belief in this stability is subject to change and 
loss. But works of art demand a different sort engagement, and so allow worldly stability to 
achieve “a representation of its own" (168). In this way, works of art do something miraculous, 
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and strange to the world of things. If we remember the representation that world stability 
achieved in useless things, we may remind ourselves of its unchanging possibility elsewhere. 
 The language of inner light attached to the root of transfiguration comes through in the 
metaphorical imagery Arendt brings into Chapter 23. Before she introduces the word 
transfiguration, she hints at it in a metaphor: “it is as though worldly stability had become 
transparent in the permanence of the Art" (168). In one sense, “becomes transparent” is just a 
figure of speech—art’s permanence makes the fact of worldly stability understandable. But if we 
try to take the statement literally, it collapses in an illuminating way. “Worldly stability” is an 
idea, a sense of reality that seldom lasts in us, as we watch the world of things succumb to 
unending natural processes. But because we don’t use artworks (because they are useless). and 
instead preserve them to be seen—they maintain the possibility to give us this a sense of reality. 
Their exterior qualities—how they interact with the world—lead to changes in how we can think 
about that world. These changes only occur because an intangible thought became tangible in the 
physical qualities of an object. What “becomes transparent” becomes part of a two way 
communication between inside and out. By using words of physical change to describe this 
communication, Arendt positions her language in the very in-between that they describe. Their 
permanence makes artworks stand out from all other human made objects. Yet that same 
permanence provides artworks’ return to its place among these use-objects, because through it 
shines the worldly stability hidden within things more quickly consumed. though this light 
emanates from within the work of art, it does not only shine on them, but through them may 
show the though hidden meaning within all other manmade things. 
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 In this transparency “a premonition of immortality, not the immortality of the soul or of 
life but of something immortal achieved by mortal hands, has become tangibly present” (168)., 
Not worldly immortality itself, but a premonition of it becomes “tangibly present" So, what 
becomes tangible is a communication of something not yet tangible. This foretold immortality is 
itself said to be made possible through human workmanship. How are we to understand 
premonition? Does Arendt mean it as a sort of gut-feeling? a sense of self-assurance or a hope 
that some immortality is achievable? This is possible, but we have to consider that this 
premonition appears outside of the individual–– and in transparency, is allowed to “shine and to 
be seen, to sound and to be heard, to speak and to be read" From this, we might say that the 
premonition is a relation made in the reciprocity of author and audience.  
  V.  Poetry and Thinking 
Words move, music moves 
Only in time; but that which is only living 
Can only die, Words, after speech, reach  
Into the silence, Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese Jar still 
moves perpetually in its stillness. 
-T.S Eliot, Four Quartets 
 Works of art stand out from other objects because they show thought as the source of 
their inspiration; among these, poetry stands furthest out from the rest of the world of things and 
is thus the “most human and least worldly of all the arts" (169). Most human, because it the 
medium “in which the end product remains closest to the thought that inspired it" (169). Poetry’s  
near-intangibility brings it closest to a visible representation of invisible human thought. 
However, Arendt describes poetry’s “closeness” as not just determined by resemblance, but as 
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peculiar kind of distance, “as it were,” travelled between thought’s original home in the heart or 
the head of man and its eventual destination in the world…” (169). Not just poetry, but all 
artworks have some sort of location between their “original home” and the world. Where are 
these locations and across what distance do they stretch? Before we ask such a literal question of 
this figure of speech we should note that Arendt’s basic answer is simply that the more 
“reification and workmanship” an artwork demands, the more the more “worldly” it is. The 
relative “location” of an object is determined by the amount of physical force needed to turn an 
idea for an object into an object.  
 This answers one side of the question—that is, how Arendt distinguishes between art 
works as they manifest in the world. While this tells why some art works are more worldly than 
others, it begs the question why a lack of physical exertion makes an art work more human. The 
more human an art-form is, the more its end-product will resemble the thought process itself, and 
as such will shine a brighter light on thinking. But a poem is still an thing among things in the 
world. how does a poems inherent lack of workmanship allow it to reach back and reflect 
thinking more immediately than other kinds of art works? Once again that other distance 
stretches out before us: between the world and our minds. This ‘human distance’ is less 
measurable than an object’s ‘worldly distance,’ because it is not determined by an object’s 
objectivity, but its absence of objectivity.  
 To the extent that they do, poetry and philosophy convey thinking into the world through 
metaphorical language. In Chapter 23, Arendt does not yet mention this relationship, however, 
she does describe poetry in conspicuously metaphorical terms. In a sense, she describes poetry 
through poetry’s language. Arendt’s description pictures something that seems close to what 
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actually happens when a poem is made, as well as how a poem objective attributes relate to other 
objects in the world. However, her metaphorical language simultaneously expresses poetry’s 
peculiar absence of objectivity. By yielding to metaphor and simile to describe poetry’s physical 
attributes, she shows that its placement among objects seems to strain the definition of physical 
objectivity. In showing this strain, she shows, not just theoretically but poetically, poetry’s 
closeness to thought and its fey existence in the world. 
 Arendt gives the physical existence of all works of art the same attributes as the other 
objects they stand out among. They have materials—paint, ink, stone—that have a certain 
durability—a lifespan that can be affected by the physical talents and implements that went into 
their making. Music and poetry are “the least ‘materialistic’ of the arts because their ‘material’ 
consists of sounds and words" (169). This gives us one sense of poetry’s near-intangibility, 
though sounds and words are physical phenomena. Poetry’s “material is language,” (169). and 
language, at least the western languages Arendt is thinking of, simply cannot be touched. Not 
spoken language, which disappears into silence almost as soon as we say it, and not written 
language, where script signifies the sounds of words and meanings to which they only arbitrarily 
correspond.  
 For Arendt, a poem’s durability is not archival ink, but its particular sort of memorability. 
Memorability is the product of the poem’s  “condensation” of language, which “directly 
transforms” remembrance into memory. Remembrance here is that collection of feelings senses 
and associations a poet, (and all of us are sometimes poets) brings to his words; his personal 
sense of the world. This collection is made into memory by means of rhythm, “through which the 
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poem becomes fixed in memory itself" (169). Namely, in us, the readers, in our memory and then 
in our thought.   
 Arendt is clearly neither using ‘material’ or durability here in the same way as she does 
with other kinds of objects and art works. Poetry’s “material is language” insofar as a poet uses 
words like a bricklayer uses bricks. But words—sometimes spoken, written, or thought—are not 
a definite material the way bricks are. I dare you to think a brick. Words move us, they carry in 
sound a notion that they are not. Good quality mortar will hold a brick wall up longer, sort of like 
how good rhythm stitches stanzas into the back of your mind and keeps their feeling in your 
heart. But the location of this wall is much discernible than the location of the back of your mind 
and the bottom of your heart. And you can’t buy rhythm at a store. 
 All this is to say that when Arendt talks about the material and durability of poetry by 
ostensibly as she is placing among other objects, she is expressing its displacement it from the 
world, and doing so through the very metaphorical language that conveys poetry into the world. 
In doing so, she tells us that every attempt to define poetry only shows its indefinability. When 
we read a poem, think about poetry, say something about it, we should always keep in mind the 
question: “what is poetry?” and keep it unanswerable. This distinct unanswerability stems from 
poetry’s intangible closeness to thought, and allows poems—if we let them—to show us that 
closeness. The intangibility of poetry’s place in the world underscores its particular fragility. On 
its own, poetry not only lives in remembrance, but relies upon our willingness to remember and 
to remember well.  
 So far, I have tried to show that for Arendt, thought can appear through metaphorical 
language, and have tried to show that she does precisely this through her use of metaphor in 
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Chapter 23. Because her own writing on thinking uses metaphorical language, that writing itself 
shows its source in her thinking. Having said this, I want to emphasize that the presence of poetic 
and metaphorical language does not tell us what Arendt’s thought process actually was, nor does 
it mean we should look to define her thought process outside of the words through which Arendt 
tried to make her thought appear. Our interest can only be in the fact that these thoughts appear at 
all. A thought’s appearance in words is necessarily separate from that thought’s original existence 
in the mind. The distance across which words point to their origin, is the same distance that 
allows thought as it appears in the world, to enter into our minds. Arendt describes what it means 
bridging that distance, that is, remembering well, in metaphor: 
“It is always the “dead letter” in which the “living spirit” must survive, a deadness from 
which it can be rescued only when the dead letter comes again into contact with a life 
willing to resurrect it, although this resurrection of the dead shares with all living things 
that it, too, will die again" (169). 
  
 Who is this willing life, and what does it mean “rescue” the living spirit out from dead 
letters? Why is this a sacrifice, and why is it worth taking? In the next section, I will ask these 
sections by looking at how Arendt described one individual that was exceptionally willing to take 
the risk to find living meaning in things, all types of things, left for dead. 
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VI.  A Poetic Thinker 
We Could no longer clearly make out the oriels and columns, 
and light had entered the façades. Whether owing 
 to the muslin curtains, the curtain liners, 
or the gas mantles beneath the hanging lamps 
—this light betrayed little of the illuminated room. 
It was concerned only with itself. 
-Walter Benjamin, “Winter Evening”  
Berlin Childhood Circa 1900 
(trans. Carl Skoggard)   
 To find a way to consider how Arendt makes thought appear through metaphorical 
language—without deferring to psychoanalytical interpretation—I will look to a text in which 
Arendt asks how another writer made his thought appear in the world in her essay “Walter 
Benjamin: 1892-1940,”  a profile of Walter Benjamin’s intellectual life and afterlife. Arendt 9
ponders the enduring obscurity of Benjamin’s identity; in the modern intellectual society where 
he lived and worked, in the “dark times” of his persecution and suicide, and even in the blinding 
light of his post-humous fame. For Arendt, this obscurity stems from his resistance, in word and 
deed, to the binding rule of society, that “no society can properly function without classification, 
without an arrangement of things and men in classes and prescribed types” (ILL 3). The problem 
Benjamin poses is that he was unique, everything he wrote “always turned out to be sui 
generis"(3). Arendt has no choice but to place him among unclassifiables. Her profile is an 
exercise in trying to describe the unclassifiable. The text asks, how can we think about what such 
person did or do without classifying them?  
 Originally published in 1968, for The New Yorker and as an introduction to Illuminations, a collection of 9
Benjamin’s essays and reflections, edited by Hannah Arendt.
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 Of course Arendt begins to answer with something like a classification: “I shall try to 
show that he thought poetically, but he was neither a poet nor a philosopher" (4). How Benjamin 
thought poetically, how he was a poetic thinker, is the guiding theme of the profile. I will 
consider the meaning of Arendt’s gesture: What does she mean by giving a title to someone 
whom she only just said evades all titles? What does the term “poetic thinking” do? 
 In the simplest sense, Benjamin was a poetic thinker because he wrote about poetry. But 
Arendt does not use the term this way. We can presume that Arendt means “poetic” and “thinker” 
in the very particular senses she gives to those words. As we have seen, these are Arendtian 
terms, tightly intertwined throughout her work. On her account, works of poetry are closest to 
thought, because their material (language). most resembles the speech we hear in our heads as 
we think. When he thinks, the thinker withdraws from the world and turns towards the inner 
movements of his mind, only to return, conveying those movements back into the world by way 
of metaphorical language. If Arendt see’s Benjamin as a thinker, it is because he made this return 
and in his way appears in the world as a thinker. Insofar as his thought appears, it appears like 
poetry. As we saw in The Life of the Mind, Arendt considers all philosophical and most poetic 
language to be metaphorical. Yet here she says that Benjamin was “neither a poet nor a 
philosopher,” (4). and neither was his writing strictly poetry or philosophy. With all this in mind, 
Arendt may have meant to speak to how Benjamin’s thought appeared in his works, conveyed 
the very mental experience of poetry’s closeness to thought in a way that no works of poetry or 
philosophy have ever been able to do in the same way. 
  With this lengthy formulation, I mean to expand the term, not to define it; definition is 
not Arendt’s goal, and it doesn’t make any sense to define a “poetic thinking” whose principal 
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characteristic was resistance to definition. I mean only to give a context in Arendt’s work for 
where the term originates. We will soon see that the term departs from this context, and that 
making this departure is essential for Arendt’s account. Arendt’s goal is to “show” poetic 
thought, because all that such thought does is appear to be seen. At stake for us then is how to 
notice poetic thinking where it appears, without defining it. Arendt does not tell us how to do 
this, but her writing does show her attempt to notice Benjamin’s poetic thought. To the extent 
that she does this, we can see her writing as an attempt to think poetically on Benjamin’s poetic 
thought. Just as we make what Arendt does in her writing our guide as we think along with her, 
she looks to what Benjamin did as a guide to think along with him. What Benjamin did through 
his writing was notice things that to most seemed mute. 
 The notion that “thought appears” is a metaphor. It conveys the distinct feeling we get 
when something out in the world suddenly means something—as though it really said something 
in particular to us. In reality, things do not communicate anything, the world does not speak—it 
is silent. In reality, Benjamin was not a poetic thinker, he was a writer who dealt with literary 
things. For Arendt, what made Benjamin a remarkable writer was his work’s steadfast attention 
to silence. Near the end of the profile, Arendt pulls a quote from Benjamin’s “The Task of the 
Translator” that could “serve as motto for all of Benjamin’s literary criticism:” “No poem is 
intended for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the listener" (48). Just 
afterwards Benjamin asks:  
“What does a literary work ‘say’? What does it communicate? It ‘tells’ very little to 
those who understand it. Its essential quality is not statement or the imparting of 
information" (ILL 69).  
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Of course, literature can literally be read and made to say many things. However, here, “those 
who understand it” allow a literary work to ‘say’ nothing, in the conviction that the essence of a 
literary work is found in what it did not say; or rather, its essence was its simple, reticent 
objectivity. What Benjamin did in his work was, as Arendt writes, “not to investigate the 
utilitarian or communicative functions of linguistic creations, but to understand them in their 
crystallized and thus ultimately fragmented form as intentionless and noncommunicative 
utterances of a ‘world essence.’”(50). The silent part of a linguistic object is what it shares with 
the rest of the world, what makes it a thing among things. When we can notice the particular way 
a literary work shares in that silence, than we hear the world utter through it. 
 And this takes practice, which Benjamin did by writing—in a sense, by making noise. 
But his writing was a sort of listening—listening for what was silent in what he wrote, and what 
he wrote about—always things that sounded and signaled and said. Arendt identifies Benjamin’s 
practice as a sort of leveling of signification: “he was concerned with the correlation between a 
street scene, a speculation on the stock exchange, a poem a thought, with the hidden line which 
held them all together"(ILL 11). Each of these things ‘speaks,’ but that “hidden line” holding 
them together is silence. If that silence could be ‘heard’ in a book by readers, then they could 
hear it on a signpost or a storefront. What is this but the very same sort of transfiguration that 
Arendt attributed to art work in Chapter 23 of The Human Condition? Except here heightened, 
broadened, and enacted. Where the artist transfigures a thought-thing into the appearance of a 
thing, it as though Benjamin took everyday objects and transfigured their prescribed “utilitarian 
and communicative functions” into their sheer appearance. In this way, It is as though Benjamin 
enacts what Arendt foresaw when she wrote: “Everything that is, must appear and nothing can 
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appear without a shape of its own; hence there is in fact no thing that does not in some way 
transcend its functional use, and its transcendence, its beauty or ugliness, is identical with 
appearing and being seen" (HC 173). Benjamin let’s this transcendent character be seen. In a 
sense, he noticed the metaphors already out in the world, waiting to be uncovered.  
 On Arendt’s account, what Benjamin’s thought shows in practice is the significance of 
those intangible gaps, the in-between region of things opposed. Benjamin heard sound through 
an attention to silence, discovered poems in commonplace objects, took the past and made it 
present, and wrote through quotations. His practice was to understand one thing by taking the 
perspective of its very opposite. This is precisely what Arendt does by naming him a poetic 
thinker—a positive formulation of a resiliently negative statement.  
 Benjamin’s poetic thinking did not just appear in his writing, but through his very 
manners and way of life as they manifested in everyday life. Arendt specifically focuses on the 
way Benjamin felt the architecture of Paris affected his experience. What I’d like to point out in 
this part of Arendt’s profile, is a transition, almost like a translation, from Benjamin’s words 
towards a particularly Arendtian description of the city—and thus of his words as an expression 
of that ever-permeating relationship between the private and public realm. As Arendt tells it, 
though Benjamin eventually came to Paris as a refugee, throughout his life, the city seems to 
have been the closest place to home for him, if for no other reason than it introduced and 
encouraged him to stroll: 
 “Its boulevards, Benjamin discovered as early as 1913, are formed by houses which ‘do 
not seem made to be lived in, but are like stone sets for people to walk between’ (Briefe 
I, 56).’ this city, around which one still can travel in a circle past the old gates, has 
remained what the cities of the Middle Ages, severely walled off and protected against 
the outside, once were: an interior, but without the narrowness of medieval streets, a 
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generously built and planned open-air intérieur with the arch of the sky like a majestic 
ceiling above it…It is the uniform façades, lining the streets like inside walls, that make 
one feel more physically sheltered in this city than in any other. The arcades which 
connect the great boulevards and offer protection from inclement weather exerted such 
an enormous fascination over Benjamin…and these passageways are indeed like a 
symbol of Paris, because they clearly are inside and outside at the same time and thus 
represent its true nature in quintessential form. In Paris a stranger feels at home because 
he can inhabit the city the way he lives in his own four walls. (ILL 20). 
 Arendt begins with a quote from Benjamin in which he repurposes the city as a 
framework for taking a walk—“strolling, idling, flânerie" (21). Benjamin is a “stranger,” yet 
here he feels at home. Arendt herself describes Paris as though it really were a dwelling. Arendt 
casts Benjamin’s experience of Paris as an indiscernible movement between private and public 
life—such that each seems to take elements of the other. She finishes the section by putting her 
description in strictly political, as opposed to poetic terms, as a “paradise, then, of bohemians, 
and not only of artists and writers but of all those who have gathered about them because they 
could not be either politically integrated—being homeless or stateless—or socially" (21). A 
reader more impartial towards Arendt (more than me that is,). might be reasonably skeptical of 
her interpretation: it would seem to border on an appropriation; her interpretation perhaps reads 
too closely to her own theoretical work. However, I would argue that these moments of closeness 
often give Arendt an opportunity to show where she and Benjamin come apart.  Though she has 
in effect situated Benjamin and his spatial experience into her own framework, his presence 
within it reveals a peculiar outcome: In Paris, one may give up the need to speak to feel 
themselves in public, and instead may be given to silently watching as one strolls within and 
without strolling crowds. In other words, the public world of Paris was disposed to qualities of 
the private world. 
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 In The Human Condition, this possibility poses a danger. As Patchen Markell showed us, 
whether “territorially” or “relationally” related, the public and private realms need to be 
separated for either to exist. The realm that Arendt identifies between the private and the political 
is the “social" The social is a vague sphere of activities that emerged from and predominates 
modern mass society, as activities of political life—previously the exclusive location of action 
and speech—begin to take on qualities of private life. For example with the rise of 
“housekeeping” as a government activity in the form of economic policy. The threat of the social 
is mass world-alienation, as common people no longer experience politics as a place where their 
speech and action will be heard and seen by each other. Instead, The political realm becomes 
experienced as a disembodied organization determining people’s income—that is, their well-
being and ultimately their survival in society.  
 Benjamin’s Paris almost seems like the quintessential expression of the social realm. But 
rather than as a danger, Arendt casts life in its social sphere as vital, hopeful and homelike.  The 
politically alienated, “stateless or homeless” strangers who sojourn there “gather” around artists 
and writers. Here again, Arendt returns to a term she often used in The Human Condition. But 
“gathering,” in the earlier text was principally used to describe the central, common activity of 
the public realm: “Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without 
changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in 
utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear" (57). There is a clear difference 
between these two senses of gathering. In the public realm, people gather around objects with 
common names. But the “Bohemians” who fled to anonymity in Paris could only gather around 
each other, either lacking distinct nationality or otherwise odd and unclassifiable. Yet clearly a 
!51
community formed: if only for a moment, perhaps these people made each other feel as though 
they had a home. 
 This does not mean that Benjamin’s life changed Arendt’s perspective on the social, or 
made less dangerous in her eyes. But by placing him in this framework, that is, her framework, 
Benjamin seems to show a human possibility that she had not foreseen from the theoretical 
perspective of The Human Condition. She sees where their paths of thinking diverge and in some 
sense shows herself attempting to imagine Benjamin’s path. In the profile Arendt makes the 
remarkably odd statement that Benjamin’s strolling “determined the pace of his thinking…
perhaps most clearly revealed in the peculiarities of his gait" (21). In the blurry social, Benjamin 
found a home; not inside, at rest, but outside, strolling about. Strolling it seems, is the external 
activity that metaphorically describes Benjamin’s inner activity. For Arendt—and I do not mean 
the theorist, but Arendt the thinker and person—this strolling, a activity emerging from the 
social, gave life to a poetic thinking that Benjamin brought to words. It is a thing, but also an act, 
a gesture that makes a thinking “tangibly present, to shine and to be seen, to sound and to be 
heard, to speak and to be read" (HC 167). 
 Walter Benjamin, in word and in manner—that is, in his vivid appearance—enters, but 
does not exactly fit into Arendt’s theoretical picture. Instead, he seems to crack, strain and break 
that picture and in this way shows something new in it. By allowing these cracks to show, she 
shows the proper mental response to the rare gift of poetic thinking—welcoming astonishment. 
To show her astonishment, Arendt enacts an authorial movement from a theoretical perspective 
into the implicit personal perspective in the world with—if only in imagination—an other.  
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Depart 
 My hope in these considerations has been to understand what Arendt meant when she 
asked us “to think what we are doing" (5). Arendt wove this phrase with a dense web of 
meaning, so that it seems to reach into the poetic. Arendt says it well when she remarks that “it is 
as though language spoken in utmost density and concentration were poetic in itself" (169). The 
concentrated meaning of a brief phrase is produced by the writer’s active “condensation” of 
many meanings into a few words. That concentration gives poetic language its memorability, its 
ability to turn over and over in the back of our minds long after we’ve put down our books. This 
companionship can become so strong that the movement of these memorable thought-things 
becomes ingrained in the very way we think. I have found this to be true of The Human 
Condition’s proposition, which grows and endures in my thoughts. At each moment of thought or 
feeling that I bring the phrase to, it glints in a new light; and all of these moments becomes 
brighter for the encounter. I know, finally, that I have simply wanted to share this liveliness with 
you.  
 In this pursuit I have tried to take Arendt’s words on their most literal and smallest terms: 
as an author’s proposition to her readers, of what she would like to do with us as we proceed 
through the book with her. To think what we do, means for us to think what we are doing as we 
read, and for Arendt to think what she is doing as she writes, and to do this together. On this 
reading, the proposition may seem impossible: we cannot think with Arendt, we can read her 
work and try to understand it. Other readings (for example, that Arendt was proposing a way to 
act in the world,). might give us a more practical direction towards understanding her. But I’ve 
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chosen this reading precisely because of the imaginative leaps it provokes us to take: Can we 
imagine what its like to think with an author? With someone we are far from both in space and 
time? Can we imagine a way of writing that thinks? Can we imagine a way of reading where we 
think as Arendt would write? Of course we cannot speak to Arendt through her writing, writing 
cannot think, and our reading does not write. But if we imagine these impossibilities as possible, 
then we might notice moments when it is as though reading becomes a sort of writing, as though 
writing becomes a sort of thinking, or as though Arendt’s thoughts met our own through her 
words. If we take these imaginative leaps, we create metaphorical relationships; the very same 
relationships that Arendt tells us bridge “the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities 
and the world of appearances…the greatest gift language could bestow on thinking and hence on 
philosophy…” (LM 105). This gift is magical, we should treasure it, but also treasure the 
intangible abyss that it crosses. Metaphorical relationships are, as it were, thought-things; 
intangible until we put them into words. They’re not true, they’re not untrue, they do nothing but 
deepen our capacity to bring meaning into the world and into what we do within it together. In a 
word, they transfigure the world. They do this if we listen and looked for them wherever they 
might be found, and do this as though it was our very ears that would make them sound and our 
very eyes that would make them spark. I can only now think to share with you some other words 
that Hannah Arendt introduced me to: 
  ''When the storyteller is loyal...to the story, there, in the end, silence will speak. Where 
the story has been betrayed, silence is but emptiness. But we, the faithful, when we have spoken 
our last word, will hear the voice of silence" 
      —Isak Dinesen, quoted in Men in Dark Times  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